How the runtime behaves

The platform handles all the infrastructure — Kubernetes, model serving, sandboxing, policy enforcement. As someone building agents on top of ops.surogate.ai, you don’t manage any of that, but a few behavioural guarantees matter when you design agents:

Sessions are durable and append-only

Every conversation is recorded as an immutable event log. If the agent crashes mid-turn, it picks up where it left off — no state lost. Tool calls and results are part of the log, so you can replay and audit any session forever.

What this means for you: writing tools and skills, you can assume the agent’s prior tool calls are visible to subsequent turns. Sessions outlive container restarts. The session ID is stable; share it freely.

A mid-turn message steers, it doesn’t restart

A user message that arrives while a turn is running is neither discarded nor treated as a cancel. The in-flight model response and its tool calls finish, then the message is folded in at the next iteration boundary as a fresh user turn and the same run continues. Several messages arriving in the same window are coalesced into one turn. A follow-up that lands just as the final response is emitted keeps the run going instead of completing the session. Synthetic user.message events (mission continuations, harness nudges) never steer.

What this means for you: a mid-task “also check Z” costs no re-run — the agent adapts without losing the work already done. An explicit Stop is a hard cancel and always wins over a steer. Note that the shipped chat composer stops the running turn before sending, so steering from that UI is the Stop button rather than a queued message; a message sent while the agent is waiting on an ask_user_question answer goes straight through.

The agent runs in an isolated sandbox

Code execution, file I/O, and terminal commands run inside a sandbox that has no access to your tenant’s other data, no credentials, no database. The sandbox only sees its own workspace at /workspace. It is keyed to the root of a session tree, so a session and every child it spawns share one sandbox and one workspace.

What this means for you: even a fully prompt-injected agent can’t exfiltrate credentials or reach other session trees. Files the agent writes are scoped to the tree’s workspace; a child writes into the same /workspace as its parent.

Governance is frozen per wake

The governance gate is composed once per wake — a platform floor (workspace path containment, path-argument hygiene; no agent config can relax it) narrowed by the agent’s own policy — and frozen for that wake. Mid-turn prompt injection cannot weaken it.

What this means for you: policy edits are projected into the agent’s runtime config with a version bump and a cache invalidation, so live sessions pick up the new policy at their next wake — you don’t have to wait for new sessions. Within a wake, nothing moves. Two more scoping rules: built-in tools absent from the catalog fail closed, while mcp__* tools bypass the built-in allow-list (they’re governed by MCP-server attachment and entitlements instead), and the coordination self-tools can never be denied.

Tools route to different locations

You don’t pick where a tool runs — but knowing helps debug behaviour:

• In the worker — fast, no sandbox needed (memory, skill loading, web search, browser, scheduling, sub-agent delegation, ask_user_question, create_artifact)
• In the sandbox — anything that touches files or runs code (terminal, process, read_file, write_file, patch)
• Through the MCP proxy — external systems via the Model Context Protocol; credentials injected by the proxy so the sandbox never sees them

See Tool catalog for the full list.

Multi-agent topology

Agents can spawn child agents via spawn_worker, delegate_task, or spawn_task. Each child is its own full session with its own event log and iteration budget, but it shares the root session’s workspace and storage prefix — no per-child storage is allocated.

Children inherit the tenant’s skills, KBs, MCPs, and memory — and the parent’s governance policy verbatim. A child is created with the parent’s agent_id, so its gate is composed from the same policy: same allow-list, same deny-list, same approval requirements. There is no per-sub-agent policy profile.

What actually scopes a child is its sub-agent definition (AGENT.md):

Frontmatter key	Effect on the child
tools	Becomes the child’s allow-list — authoritative, not intersected with the parent’s
disallowed_tools	Dropped from the child’s toolset. Only takes effect when the definition sets no tools; an allow-list supersedes it
model	Used unless the spawn call names a model explicitly
max_iterations	Narrows the child’s budget when smaller than the cap

Both lists are applied as a toolset filter, not a runtime denial — an excluded tool’s schema never reaches the child’s model, so there is nothing for it to refuse or argue around. The iteration cap is 30, but where a child’s budget comes from depends on how it was spawned: spawn_worker and delegate_task hand over a slice of the parent’s remaining budget (so a child spawned late in a long turn starts with less), while a spawn_task attempt is claimed by the dispatcher with the full 30, narrowed only by the definition’s max_iterations.

Hard depth limit: 2 (one orchestrator level beneath the root). Prevents runaway delegation trees.

What this means for you: you can build coordinator agents that fan out work, but you can’t build arbitrary-depth agent trees. The 2-level cap is a safety property.

Saga rollback for multi-step external mutations

When saga.enabled: true, sequential state-changing tool calls are tracked. If a later step fails, completed steps roll back via filesystem checkpoints (built-in tools) or declared undo tools (MCP tools).

What this means for you: design your MCP servers with explicit undo tools (delete_ticket undoes create_ticket) so saga can compensate. Without an undo, the saga enters an escalated state and a human must intervene.

Trust boundaries that affect you

Concern	Where it’s enforced
Per-session network policy	Sandbox can reach only the MCP proxy + the session tree’s storage. Internet, DB, other sessions: denied.
Per-tool governance	Synchronous check before every tool call. Denials are always logged (policy.denied); allowed calls are logged too when the deployment enables governance.log_allowed.
Per-session-tree resource isolation	Each session tree has its own storage path and its own sandbox
Per-tenant data isolation	Org-scoped storage, JWT auth, never cross-tenant

You can read every governance decision after the fact in the session’s POLICIES tab.

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That’s the runtime behavior you need. Implementation internals — the harness loop, lease semantics, the events table schema, K8s topology — live in the invergent-ai/surogates runtime repo and matter only if you’re contributing to the platform itself.