MCP & Vault

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open standard for connecting LLMs to external tools and data. Surogate ships a full MCP client + a credential-injecting proxy + security scanning.

You manage MCP servers in Skills & Tools → MCP SERVERS tab (Develop or Work mode). The Vault entry at the top of the left rail takes you to the credential store in Settings → Vault (see Vault).

Architecture

 

Sandbox / Worker
    │
    │  MCP tool call
    ▼
MCP Proxy (separate K8s service)
    │
    │  injects credentials from vault
    ▼
External MCP Server (stdio or HTTP)

The proxy is the trusted credential broker:

• Sandboxes can only reach the MCP proxy (K8s NetworkPolicy enforces this)
• The proxy holds credentials in memory (fetched from the Vault on connection)
• Outbound calls to MCP servers carry injected headers/args without the sandbox ever seeing secrets

This is the structural fix for “what if my agent leaks an API key” — the agent literally cannot access keys, even if fully prompt-injected.

Two transports

Registering a remote MCP endpoint

The blocks below show the shape of a server’s stored config — the same fields the Studio form (or /api/mcp-servers) writes into the registry. There is no config file on disk to edit.

Stdio

Launch the MCP server as a subprocess; communicate via stdin/stdout. Configuration:

yaml

mcp_servers:
  github:
    transport: stdio
    command: npx
    args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"]
    credential_refs: ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]   # resolved from Vault
    timeout: 120

Best for: locally-installable CLI-like tools, MCP servers shipped as npm packages.

HTTP / StreamableHTTP

Connect to a remote MCP server over HTTP:

yaml

mcp_servers:
  jira:
    transport: http
    url: "https://mcp.acme.com/jira"
    auth: oauth
    oauth:
      client_id: "surogates-agent"
      scope: "read write"
    timeout: 120

Best for: cloud-hosted MCP servers, shared infrastructure across tenants.

MCP client features

Feature	Description
Auto-reconnect	Exponential backoff with up to 5 retries on connection loss
Sampling	MCP servers can request LLM completions back through the client
Environment filtering	Only explicitly allowed env vars passed to stdio servers
Credential stripping	Secrets scrubbed from error messages
Per-server timeout	Configurable per server
Thread safety	Dedicated background event loop for MCP connections

OAuth 2.1 PKCE for protected servers

 

1. Agent needs to call an OAuth-protected MCP tool
2. MCP client checks for cached tokens (on disk)
3. If no valid token:
   a. Start ephemeral localhost HTTP server for redirect
   b. Open browser to authorization URL with PKCE challenge
   c. User approves in browser
   d. Callback server receives authorization code
   e. Exchange code for access + refresh tokens
   f. Store tokens on disk for reuse
4. Attach access token to MCP requests
5. Auto-refresh when token expires

Configuration:

yaml

mcp_servers:
  salesforce:
    url: "https://mcp.salesforce.com/mcp"
    auth: oauth
    oauth:
      client_id: "pre-registered-id"
      client_secret: "secret"
      scope: "api refresh_token"
      redirect_port: 0                # auto-pick available port
      client_name: "Surogates Agent"
      token_dir: "/var/lib/surogates/tokens"

The credential vault

Settings → Vault is the project’s credential store; values are write-only and never shown again after saving, and the list API never returns them. The Vault entry on the MCP Servers tab links to it. See Vault for the full tab. Entries are named in an MCP server’s credential_refs, and every MCP server in the project can reference them.

System-owned credentials (used by platform/system agents) are protected: the API refuses to delete them (403), and a credential still consumed by a running agent’s MCP server can’t be deleted until you stop the consumer (409, in-use conflict).

How references work

A server config never carries a secret. It carries a credential_refs array naming Vault entries and saying where each value is injected. The short form is a bare name:

json

"credential_refs": ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]

• stdio → injected as env.GITHUB_TOKEN
• http → injected as headers.Authorization: Bearer <value>

Use the structured form when the target variable or header differs from the Vault name:

json

"credential_refs": [
  {"name": "MY_TOKEN", "env": "GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN"},
  {"name": "API_KEY", "header": "X-API-Key"},
  {"name": "AUTH", "header": "Authorization", "prefix": "Bearer "}
]

Field	Notes
name	Vault entry name (required)
env	Inject as this environment variable (stdio)
header	Inject as this HTTP header (http)
prefix	Prepended to the value — header form only (e.g. Bearer )

With neither env nor header, the value is injected as an environment variable named after the credential.

The Auth dialog on an MCP server writes these for you: API key produces {"name": …, "header": "X-API-Key"}, Bearer produces {"name": …, "header": "Authorization", "prefix": "Bearer "}, OAuth produces {"name": …, "env": "CLIENT_SECRET"}.

At runtime the proxy resolves each ref from the Vault and injects it into the outbound connection. The sandbox never sees the value, and every lookup is written to the tenant audit log as a credential.access entry.

Encryption

Vault credentials are encrypted at rest with Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256). The symmetric key lives in a K8s cluster secret.

Where MCP servers are registered

The MCP Servers tab: the vault, the server list, and a server’s transport and exposed tools

The registry is exclusively DB-backed — the mcp_servers table, written by the Studio UI and /api/mcp-servers. There are no on-disk config layers.

Servers are project (org) scoped: every server you register is visible to the whole project. What a given session actually loads is decided per agent — the proxy loads only the servers attached to that agent, so two agents in the same project get different toolsets from the same registry. Servers toggled off are skipped entirely.

The PLATFORM / ORG / USER chip on a server row is a label for your own bookkeeping (the REST list can filter on it). It does not change who can see the server and it does not affect load precedence.

Security scanning

Every MCP tool definition is scanned before registration:

Threat	What it catches
Invisible Unicode	Zero-width chars, bidi marks in tool names/descriptions
Prompt injection	Deceptive descriptions that trick the LLM
Hidden HTML	HTML comments with invisible instructions
Tool poisoning	Descriptions that manipulate the LLM into dangerous behaviour
Rug-pull	Tool definitions that change between connections (SHA-256 fingerprinting)

Tools failing scanning are not registered. Scan results land in the tenant audit log:

sql

SELECT * FROM audit_log
WHERE type = 'mcp.tool_scan'
  AND org_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at DESC;

Rug-pull detection

If a server returns a different tool definition on reconnect (different fingerprint), the scanner emits a warning. Common cause: the upstream MCP server got updated. Review the diff before re-enabling.

REST API

Method	Endpoint	Purpose
GET	/api/mcp-servers	List (filter by project_id, enabled, layer)
GET	/api/mcp-servers/composio/catalog	Live Composio toolkit catalog
GET	/api/mcp-servers/{id}	Detail with connected tools
POST	/api/mcp-servers	Add server
PATCH	/api/mcp-servers/{id}	Update config (including the enabled toggle)
GET	/api/mcp-servers/{id}/in-use	List agents referencing this server
DELETE	/api/mcp-servers/{id}	Remove server (409 if attached to a running agent)
GET	/api/credentials	List Vault entries (names + timestamps only, never values)
POST	/api/credentials	Store a credential (same name overwrites — this is how “Update” works)
GET	/api/credentials/{name}/in-use	List MCP servers referencing this credential
DELETE	/api/credentials/{name}	Remove (403 if system-owned, 409 if in use)

There is no dedicated /enable endpoint — enabling/disabling is a PATCH that flips the enabled flag. Tool security scanning happens in the MCP proxy at tool-discovery time, not as a synchronous call on this API. Updating a credential is a POST with the same name (the store upserts); there is no PUT.

What’s next

Hub for the artifact versioning layer. Datasets and Training for the training pipeline. Use cases → “Build an MCP server with OAuth.”